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FAMILY COURT
ROCKLAND COUNTY
A.S. v.A.G. 3 14
(decided July 8, 1994)
Respondent claimed that a New York order of support
statute3 15 violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the New York
State Constitution 3 16 and United States Constitution. 317
Respondent alleged that the establishment of a filing date for
child support treated children who received public assistance
differently from those who did not.3 18 The Family Court of
Rockland County held that the statute did not violate equal
protection because the distinction drawn was rationally based on a
3 19
legitimate state objective.
In February 1993, the court determined that respondent, J.G.,
fathered a child, K.L.B., in October 1983. The court sent the
case to the Hearing Examiner to determine the issue of child
support. 320 Retroactive child support was denied. 32 1 The Hearing
Examiner held that the child support provision denied equal
protection to those children who did not receive public assistance
as well as those parents who were required to pay the longer
support period. 32 2 The Hearing Examiner concluded "that there
[was] no rational basis for imposing different child support
314. 162 Misc. 2d 10, 615 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Faro. CL Rockland County

1994).
315. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545.1 (McKinney 1993).
316. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
317. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides
in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
318. AS., 162 Misc. 2d at 11, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 580.

319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

17, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
11, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
11-12, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
12, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
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obligations." 323 The petitioner, A.S., claimed that the Hearing
Examiner erred when it found the statute unconstitutional. 324 In
addition, A.S. claimed that the child support should not have
been awarded retroactively to the date when public assistance was
filed.325

The issue before the New York Family Court was whether the
provision in section 545.1 of the Family Court Act32 6 was an
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause because
it allowed children who received public assistance, to receive
child support for a longer period of time than those children who
did not receive assistance. This discrepancy existed because the
payor had to pay retroactively to the date of filing for public
assistance, whereas one who did not receive public assistance
only received child support retroactively from the date of filing
for support.32 7 The New York Family Court reversed the
decision of the Hearing Examiner and held that "no declaration

of unconstitutionality should have been entertained." 32 8 Further,
323. Id.
324. Id. at 12, 615 N.Y.S.2d 580.
325. The petitioners also argued that the hearing Examiner erred in the
amount of the base child support when she reduced it from $136.91 to $70.00
per week. Id. at 12, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 580. At the end of the opinion the court
stated that it had "considered the other contentions raised on the objections[,]"
such as the reduction in child support, and denied them. Id. at 18, 615
N.Y.S.2d at 584.
326. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545.1 (1993). The Act states that the order of
filiation
shall be effective as of the earlier of the date of the application for an
order of filiation, or, if the children for whom support is sought are in
receipt of public assistance, the date for which their eligibility for public
assistance was effective. Any retroactive amount of child support shall
be support arrears/past-due support and shall be paid in one sum or
periodic sums as the court shall direct ....
Id.
327. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 17, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
328. Id. Although the hearing examiner claimed that the statute was
unconstitutional on both a state and federal level the family court did not
address the Federal Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 12, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
However, prior decisions of the court of appeals have held that the New York
State Equal Protection clause is as broad as that of the United States

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/35

2

et al.: Equal Protection

19951

EQUAL PROTECTION

921

the court held that the classification between the children was
3 29
reasonable.

Initially, the Family Court questioned the authority of the
Hearing Examiner to declare section 545.1 unconstitutional. 33 0
The court stated that a court of original jurisdiction should not
declare a statue unconstitutional unless the "'conclusion is
inescapable' or where the consequences "may be severe and the
damage irreparable.'

331

The court determined that there was no

occasion. 332

such
Furthermore, if this was such an instance, the
Hearing Examiner had failed to follow the specific procedural
requirements.

333

Next, the court evaluated the equal protection claim. Generally,
New York courts have applied the standard set out in Alevy v.
Downstate Medical Center334 when analyzing equal protection
issues: The Alevy standard sets forth a two tiered approach. 335
The first tier triggers strict scrutiny when the individual is in a
"suspect ' 336 classification 337 or when a fundamental interest,

Constitution. See generally Golden v. Clark, 76 N.Y.2d 618, 624, 564
N.E.2d 611, 614, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1990).
329. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 17, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
330. Id. at 12-13, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
331. Id. "A statute should not ordinarily be set aside as unconstitutional by
a court of original jurisdiction unless such conclusion is inescapable." See
generally N.Y. STATUTE § 150 (McKinney 1993).
332. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 12-13, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
333. Id. at 13-14, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82. The court explained that
according to CPLR § 1012(b), when a court finds that there is a question of
constitutionality of a statute, the Attorney General must be notified of the
proceeding. In this case, the Hearing Examiner failed to notify the Attorney
General. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1012(b) (McKinney 1993).
334. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976). The
petitioner claimed that respondents admissions policies violated State and
Federal Equal Protection Clauses because the policies gave minority students
with lower qualifications and scores a better opportunity for acceptance. Id. at
331, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
335. Id. at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
336. See generally In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). In Griffiths, the
Supreme Court stated that "[i]n order to justify the use of a suspect
classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial and that its use of the classification
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free speech" is involved. 338 The

second tier, which contains the rationality test, is applied when
33 9
neither a fundamental interest nor a suspect class is affected.
Under this tier, the court questions whether there is a "reasonable
relationship to some legitimate legislative objective." 3 40 The
Family Court concluded that section 545.1 of the Family Court
Act did not fit into the categories in the first tier and applied the
34 1
rational basis standard.
The federal courts, when analyzing equal protection issues for
social and welfare programs, use a rational relation test similar to
is 'necessary... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of
its interest." Id. (citations omitted).
337. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 14, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 582. "Suspect
classifications include those based upon national origin, race, [or] alienage."
Id. (citations omitted). See In re Giffiths, 413 U.S. at 717 (1973) (finding the
state bar exclusion of aliens was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
because it "deprives them of employment opportunities"); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (concluding that statutes that prevent interracial marriages
violate equal protection because the freedom to marry a person from a different
race cannot be infringed upon by the state); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954) (stating that a jury that does not contain any members of the same class
as the defendant is a violation of equal protection rights).
338. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 14, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 582. See Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (finding that durational residency
requirements violate equal protection for those who frequently move because it
infringes on the fundamental interest in voting); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting
picketing in front of a school is a violation of equal protection rights because it
makes a distinction between employment picketing and peaceful picketing).
3j9. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 14, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
340. Alevy v. Downstate Medical Ctr., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332, 348 N.E.2d
537, 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 87.
341. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 14, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
The [rational basis] test has been applied with great indulgence,
especially in the area of economics and social welfare where, for
example, it has been said that '[i]f the classification has some
"reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because
the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality."' Indeed, in actual application the
rejection of classifications under this test appears to be rare.
Id. at 14-15, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 582. (quoting Alevy, 39 N.Y.2d at 332, 348
N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87).
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that found in Dandridge v. Williams.3 42 In Dandridge, the
United States Supreme Court held that there was no violation of
equal protection when the provision challenged was reasonably
related to a legitimate government interest. 3 43 Further, the Court
stated that a provision, in social or welfare programs, was not
unconstitutional merely because it was imperfect. 344
Similarly, the A.S. court determined that the objective to
protect "the public purse" was a sufficient legislative purpose and
therefore upheld the statute. 345 To achieve this objective, the
state mandated a parent to pay child support retroactively to the
date of filing for public assistance. This measure would have
served to recoup the public assistance received by "persons
legally responsible for those children." 3 4 6 In addition to the

mandate, the A.S. court added that the statute in question would
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it was not
perfect or based on mathematical certainty. 3 4 7

342. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The action was brought pursuant to a provision
in the Maryland welfare system that only permitted $250 for a family in need
of assistance regardless of the size of the household. Id. at 473-74.
343. Id. at 485.
344. Id.
345. AS., 162 Misc. 2d at 16, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 583. Finding this first
reason sufficient, the court left analysis of the legislative history for a later
date. Id. at 17, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
346. Id. at 16, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
347. Id. at 15, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83. The court based its decision, in
part, on the reasoning in In re Davis, 57 N.Y.2d 382, 442 N.E.2d 1227, 456
N.Y.S.2d 716 (1982). In Davis, the court of appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the New York State Social Services Law which classified
people who were eligible for medical assistance benefits on a reasonable basis
and further held that:
[i]n the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
law are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.'
Id. at 388, 442 N.E.2d at 1229-30, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 719. (quoting Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911))).
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The Family Court also relied on two New York Court of

Appeals decisions, Wiggins v. Town of Somers348 and McGee v.
Korman,34 9 to determine

the

constitutionality

of section

545.1.350 In Wiggins, the court stated that statutes are presumed

to be constitutional unless their invalidity is demonstrated beyond
a reasonable doubt.351 Twenty-nine years later McGee upheld
Wiggins. The McGee court stated that "[e]nactments of the

Legislature - a coequal branch of government - may not casually

be set aside by the judiciary. The applicable legal principles for
finding invalidity are firmly embedded in the law: Statutes are
presumed constitutional; while the presumption is rebuttable,
invalidity must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt." 352
In addition, the A.S. court stated that action to declare a statute
unconstitutional should be used only as a last resort. 3 53
In sum, the court used the two tiered system of equal protection
analysis followed by both state and federal courts. The court held
that the New York order of support statute was rationally related
348. 4 N.Y.2d 215, 149 N.E.2d 869, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958).
349. 70 N.Y.2d 225, 513 N.E.2d 236, 519 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1987).
Candidates running for the office of the surrogate were required to obtain a
different number of signatures. Plaintiffs brought action under equal
protection.
350. A.S., 162 Misc. 2d at 15-16, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
351. Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 217-18, 149 N.E.2d 869,
870-71, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (1958). The plaintiff brought an action
alleging that the town ordinance which provides "that no person may transport
or dump within the town garbage 'originating outside of the Town of Somers"'
is arbitrary because it distinguishes between Somers and non-Somers garbage.
The court held that the ordinance is merely trying to reduce the amount of
garbage dumped and is therefore not a violation of rights. Id.
352. McGee v. Korman, 70 N.Y.2d 225, 231, 513 N.E.2d 236, 238, 519
N.Y.S.2d 350, 352. The A.S. court agreed with McGee and stated "where a
statute is challenged as irrational or arbitrary, a court may even hypothesize
the motivations of the State Legislature to discern any conceivable legitimate
objective promoted by the provision under attack." A.S., 162 Misc. 2d 16,
615 N.Y.S.2d 583 (citing Meresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 251, 475
N.E.2d 95, 99, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724, 728 (1984)). "The drastic step of striking
a statute as unconstitutional is to be taken as a last resort." AS., 162 Misc. 2d
at 16, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 583 (citing Wiggins, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 149 N.E.2d 869,
173 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958)).
353. Id.
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to the state objective of protecting the public purse, and upheld
the statute as constitutional.
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